ABSTRACT The security of binary programs is significantly threatened by software vulnerabilities. When vulnerabilities are found, those applications are exposed to malicious attacks that exploit the known vulnerabilities. Thus, it is necessary to patch them when vulnerabilities are reported to the public as soon as possible. However, it still heavily relies on manual work to locate and correct the corresponding defective code in the binary programs. In order to raise productivity and ensure software security, it becomes imperative to automate the process. In this paper, we propose BINPATCH to automatically patch known vulnerabilities of binary programs. It first locates the defective function, which contains the vulnerability, via similar code comparison. Then, it reuses the corresponding code from the correct version of the defective function as the patch code and inserts it to the defective function via binary rewriting. BINPATCH is evaluated on eight real-world vulnerabilities, and the experimental results show that it is able to not only locate the defective code effectively but also patch the code correctly.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vulnerabilities constitute one of the largest threats to the software security. Although developers and analyzers have spent much effort to remove the vulnerabilities, many of them, even including security-critical ones, still exist in the released software, i.e., binary programs or executables. In addition to the potential vulnerabilities which have not been reported (i.e., zero-day vulnerabilities), binary programs are even threatened by malicious attacks exploiting known ones. When a vulnerability is found and reported to the public, vendor cannot always provide the corresponding patch for their released binaries in time, let along for legacy binary applications which lack regular maintenance. It has been found that many vulnerabilities have the life span over 12 months, generalized across numerous types of software [38] . Therefore, in order to ensure the security, it is necessary to patch the binary programs under that situation. However, the process stills heavily relies on manual work which is tedious and time-consuming.
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To automatically patch the binary programs, there exist two challenges to be handled. The first one is defective code localization (C1). Released binary programs commonly have been stripped that their debug information and symbol names are discarded. Even though the vulnerabilities are known, it is difficult to find the corresponding defective code in stripped binaries. The other challenge is to generate correct and compatible patch code which protects the defective binary code from vulnerabilities (C2). Binary code (or machine code) is a low-level language which needs to manage the memory, including allocating registers, arranging the stack and heap, etc. After the compilation, the memory management of binary code has been completed by compilers. If the inserted patch code occupies or modifies the managed memory improperly, the resulting binary code would produce faulty results, e.g., segmentation faults. Thus, the generated patch code is required to not only correct the defective code, but also avoid breaking the context of the original program.
In the literature, EC [56] is the typical solution for binary program patching. On one hand, it locates the defective code with the spectrum-based fault localization technique, which requires numerous test cases to fulfill the target [66] .
Nevertheless, binary programs, especially the legacy ones, usually lack test cases. Actually, it is still an open question for testing techniques to trigger arbitrary code and obtain full coverage of binaries [32] . On the other hand, EC generates candidate patch code by manipulating the defective code with empirical rules (including instruction insertion, removal, and swapping), then validates the candidates with test cases. Because of the pre-defined manipulations, EC lakes specifications of intended behaviors. It adopts test cases as the criteria to search for the real patch code. As a result, it would produce plausible patches [41] which pass all tests but do not actually remove the vulnerabilities. ClearView [54] and SafeStack [10] monitor the running binary programs and patch the vulnerabilities online once they find erroneous behaviors. The two solutions are short-term, and they both bring extra overhead to the original execution of programs. KARMA [11] focuses on patching Android kernels which are not stripped, i.e. the debug and symbol information is reversed. Therefore, it is less effective to handle COTS (Commercial Off-The-Shelf) binaries which are commonly stripped.
In this paper, we propose BINPATCH, an automatic methodology patching known vulnerabilities of binary programs. Given the defective function that contains the known vulnerability, BINPATCH firstly locates the corresponding function in the target binary program via code similarity comparison. Then, it extracts the code from the correct version of the defective function as the patch code. BINPATCH transforms the patch code into compatible form, and inserts it into the target program via binary rewriting.
Since the vulnerability has been known, in order to overcome C1, BINPATCH adopts the technique of binary code similarity comparison which is effective in locating known vulnerabilities [9] , [17] , [20] , [21] , [55] . The technique could handle stripped binaries and has no need for test cases. To solve C2, BINPATCH extracts the patch code from the correct version of the defective function, ensuring the patch could handle the vulnerability correctly. It does not rely on test cases to specify the intended behaviors of the patch code. Besides, BINPATCH performs transformation on the extracted code to make it compatible with the target program. We adopt eight real-world vulnerabilities to evaluate the capacity of BINPATCH. The results show that it is able to not only locate defective code effectively, but also patch the vulnerabilities correctly.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are as followed:
• We propose an automatic method to patch known vulnerabilities of binary programs. With the code of a known vulnerability, we locate the defective function in the binary program via code similarity comparison, and generate patch code by reusing corresponding code from the correct version of the defective function.
• We propose the technology to fulfill patch code extraction and transfer between binary programs. We align the (emulated) execution traces of the defective function and its correct version to extract the patch code. After the processes of Used Register Protection, Function Argument Replacement, and Conditional Jump Targets Determination, the patch code is then transformed into the compatible form for the target defective function. The method is capable of handling vulnerabilities which require complex operations to patch, and avoids the overfitting caused by test case validation.
• We implement the approach in a prototype system named BINPATCH. We evaluate BINPATCH on eight realworld vulnerabilities. The experimental results show that BINPATCH is able to locate the defective code effectively and patch it correctly.
II. MOTIVATION AND OVERVIEW
In this section, we use an example to illustrate the challenges of patching vulnerabilities in binary programs and explain the basic idea of BINPATCH. The first challenge for the patching is defective code localization (C1). We download NConvert v6.17 from its home page, disassemble it with IDA Pro v6.6, 4 and manually locate png_set_PLTE at address 0x81AE780. We also find its caller functions which invoke subroutines explicitly in NConvert, as shown in Figure 1 . Each node represents a function, and every directed edge points from a caller to its callee. Hex numbers are function start addresses in NConvert. By manual analysis, we find corresponding statically-linked libpng functions and attach their names in the figure. func_80be580 and func_8139cd0 are two userdefined functions of NConvert. There are no existing test cases for NConvert. If locating png_set_PLTE in it with test cases (e.g., EC [56] ), we need to construct crafted inputs to trigger one of its callers firstly. Nevertheless, func_8139cd0 has no explicit callers in NConvert. It might be invoked via indirect calls, and unfortunately, its callers are difficult to decide accurately with existing methods [47] . png_read_png has no caller either. It might be just statically-linked but never invoked. The remaining function func_80be580 is the subroutine of another 21 NConvert functions. Then we need to further analyze NConvert in order to find possible execution paths for the defective function, which is still an issue of binary program analysis [32] .
A. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
The second challenge is the generation of correct and compatible patch code (C2). The addition and removal of code presented in Listing 2 could be considered as the best practice and baseline of patching. It leverages the branch structure to decide the value of max_palette_length (Line 9-12, Line 33-39) which is then compared with num_palette (Line 16, Line 43-44). Since the above operations are completely new to the original function, it is difficult to generate them with pre-defined instruction manipulation rules.
B. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
For binary program patching, we propose BINPATCH to handle the challenges. Figure 2 presents the work flow of BINPATCH. In the first step of Defective Function Localization ( §III-A), given the defective binary program NConvert v6.17 which contains the defective function png_set_PLTE, BINPATCH locates the defective function via binary code similarity comparison. With the source code of libpng v1.6.18, we compile it and set the binary code of png_set_PLTE as the reference vulnerable function. Then, BINPATCH is adopted to compare the reference function to each target function of NConvert in pairs and calculate a similarity score. After this step, BINPATCH generates a list of candidate defective functions from NConvert, which is ranked by the similarity scores in descending order. It considers the function with the highest similarity score as the candidate to patch. Next, in the step of Patch Generation ( §III-B), BINPATCH extracts the patch code from png_set_PLTE v1.6.20, the correct version. It runs instrumented png_set_PLTE v1.6.20 with the input which triggers the vulnerability, and emulates the candidate defective function located in NConvert with the same input. The (emulated) execution paths of the two functions are recorded simultaneously. Basing on the differences between the two paths, BINPATCH generates the patch code. In the last step of Binary Rewriting ( §III-C), BINPATCH inserts the patch code into NConvert and outputs the patched binary program along with a log recording the rewriting information, including insertion point address, patch code size, etc.
In summary, BINPATCH focuses on patching known vulnerabilities in binary programs. To address C1, it adopts the technique of binary code similarity comparison. With reference vulnerable function, it is able to locate the defective function in the stripped binary program. To solve C2, it reuses the corresponding code from the correct version of the defective function as the patch code, which guarantees to generate patches with intended behaviors.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we explain each step of BINPATCH and discuss how it patches known vulnerabilities of binary programs in details.
A. DEFECTIVE FUNCTION LOCALIZATION
BINPATCH is proposed to patch known vulnerabilities of binary programs. Thus, it locates the defective function in the target binary program by code similarity comparison. According to bug reports or databases of vulnerabilities, e.g., CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures), 5 analyzers obtain the information of the reference functions which contain the known vulnerabilities. Then, they use BINPATCH to locate the similar match of the reference function in the target defective binary program.
We base the process on CACompare [26] , a semanticsbased similar binary function detector. CACompare performs the similarity comparison via sampling. Given the reference function with the known vulnerability (V), it provides V and every target function T of the defective program with identical random values as the input, and emulates their execution. The semantic signature of each function is captured during the emulation. Then, it compares the signature of V to that of each T in pairs, and calculates a score to measure their similarity. After this step, BINPATCH obtains the list of T which is sorted basing on the similarity scores in descending order. The Top 1 function on the list is considered as the candidate defective function to be patched.
B. PATCH GENERATION
In this step, BINPATCH extracts the patch code (P) from the correct function (C). It firstly captures the path conditions of C and the candidate defective function D, denoted as P C and P D ( §III-B1). Then, it aligns P C and P D ( §III-B2). The insertion point of P in D is decided as well. Basing on the results of alignment, P is extracted and transformed into the compatible form for D ( §III-B3).
1) PATH TRIGGERING
BINPATCH executes the instrumented C with the test case that triggers the vulnerability. It records the path condition of the triggered path. Meanwhile, it records the runtime input values of C, including argument values, accessed global variable values, heap variable values, and return values of subroutines [80] . Since the vulnerability is known, it is reasonable that the test cases covering the vulnerability are available. For example, such test cases of png_set_PLTE could be found in the CVE database. It is worth nothing that the test case is not to specify or validate the patch code, but to trigger the path which corresponds to the vulnerability.
Next, BINPATCH emulates D with the input values of C, and captures the corresponding path condition. When D accesses global variables or heap variables, BINPATCH assigns corresponding ones of C basing on the accessing order. It is fulfilled in the same way to assign return values of subroutines. BINPATCH stops the emulation if D accesses illegal addresses, e.g., the overwritten return address caused by buffer overflow. Figure 3 presents the extracted path conditions of png_set_PLTE in libpng v1.6.20 and NConvert v6.17 separately. In each sub-figure, the executed code is shown on the left. The instructions of conditional branches are marked with dotted boxes, from which the path conditions are inferred and shown on the right. For each entry on a line, the first tow elements are the variable values of the condition during the (emulated) execution. The third element is the condition flag which indicates how the two variable are compared (Z: zero, L: signed less than, BE: unsigned below or equal to). The last one is the corresponding result of the condition.
2) PATH CONDITION ALIGNMENT
In this step, BINPATCH aligns P C and P D to extract the patch code. Since the input is error-triggering, the unique conditions of P C but missing in P D indicate the code which removes the vulnerabilities.
Before the alignment, BINPATCH firstly pre-processes each path condition in order to ease the following alignment. Algorithm 1 presents the pseudocode. BINPATCH unifies all conditions along the triggered path into the strict inequalities with equivalent semantics (Line 4-5), i.e., strictly less than (<). For example, the original condition flag of the last condition in Figure 3b is BE. BINPATCH then unifies it with B that the variables are exchanged and the result is negated as well. Additionally, for each variable in the condition, BINPATCH captures all its possible values via value set analysis [4] , [84] . Figure 4 shows the value sets of corresponding condition variables in Figure 3 . arg_ * represents the arguments of the function. 
Algorithm 1 The Pre-Process of Path Condition
Afterwards, BINPATCH identifies the compound logic operations in P C and P D separately (Line 8). For binary code, the implemented order of conditions in a compound logic might be different from that for the source code, which depends on the compilers and compilation settings, e.g., optimization options. Taking png_set_PLTE as an example, its disjunction png_ptr == NULL || info_ptr == NULL is implemented in the reverse order in Figure 3b , i.e., info_ptr is checked firstly, then png_ptr. In contrast, it is in the normal order in Figure 3a . Thus, when aligning conditions of compound logics, BINPATCH merely considers the contents, but ignores the order of conditions in the compound logic. Figure 5 depicts the simplified control flow graph (CFG) of that disjunction. Two conditions are considered to belong to a compound logic, if the basic blocks they reside in (bb_0 and bb_1) satisfy: i) bb_0 is the strict and immediate dominator of bb_1, and ii) bb_0 and bb_1 share one same immediate successor (bb_2). It is in the same way to decide whether two compound logics constitute a larger one.
Next, BINPATCH aligns the value sets of P C and P D with the longest common subsequence algorithm (LCS). Algorithm 2 presents the pseudocode deciding whether two conditions could be aligned, which is the core of LCS. For the condition M of P C and N of P D , if they both belong to compound logics, BINPATCH gets all the conditions of the compound logics (M and N ). If the contents of M and N are equivalent, then they could be aligned (Line 2-6). M could be aligned to N when their condition flags are equivalent, and each variable value set of N is the subset of the corresponding one of M (Line 7-12). For example, Line 1-2 in Figure 4a , which constitute a compound logic, could be aligned to the first two lines in Figure 4b , while Line 3 is unaligned with no corresponding elements. Additionally, because the condition flag L is equivalent to B when the variables are positive, Line 4 in Figure 4a could be aligned to the third line in Figure 4b . The insertion point in D is the program point after the path condition whose corresponding condition in C is the last aligned condition before the first unaligned one. Thus, in Figure 3b , the insertion point of NConvert is the program point right after the second path condition.
3) PATCH CODE EXTRACTION AND TRANSFORMATION
After the process of alignment, BINPATCH extracts the patch code from the control flow graph of the correct function, which is dominated by the basic block of the first unaligned path condition and post-dominated by that of the next aligned condition. BINPATCH performs backward program slicing [82] , [83] on each variable of the patch code in order to obtain complete functionality. Figure 6 displays the process. Figure 6a gives the first unaligned and next aligned path condition of correct png_set_PLTE (v1.6.20) in dotted boxes, i.e., the third and fourth condition in Figure 6a . The instructions of the corresponding program slices are in the bold format, which are extracted as the patch code (Figure 6b) .
Algorithm 2 Alignment Decision
Then, BINPATCH transforms the patch code into compatible form for the candidate defective function D, including the FIGURE 6. Patch extraction and transformation. VOLUME 7, 2019 following processes: i) protecting used registers, ii) replacing function arguments, and iii) determining conditional jump targets.
Used Register Protection: Because of variant compilation settings, strategies that allocate registers are different. The patch code would occupy the registers of D and break the local context. Thus, BINPATCH saves the original register values onto the stack, and restores them before the exit of the patch code. As shown in Figure 6c , the instruction pushad, which pushes the contents of general-purpose registers onto the stack, is added at Line 1. popad, the reverse operation of pushad, is also added at Line 14 to restore the registers.
Function Argument Replacement: BINPATCH replaces the function arguments accessed in the patch code with corresponding ones of D, because arguments on the stack might be accessed with different stack pointer registers (i.e., esp or ebp), which is decided by compilers. ebp would be used as a general-purpose register, as shown at Line 1 in Figure 6b , while that is rare for esp. BINPATCH then adopts esp to access arguments for the patch code. According to the calling convention, BINPATCH recognizes the arguments and obtains their offsets relative to esp. For example, the assembly function png_set_PLTE of NConvert in Figure 3b is compiled basing on cdecl, the default calling convention used by C compilers for the IA-32 architecture [22] . The arguments are prepared by the caller. Thus, for a callee, the arguments are placed on the high addresses relative to esp on the stack. At the very beginning, the compiler saves the value of ebp (4 bytes), then allocates a buffer of size 0x38 for local variables (sub esp, 38h), overall 0x3C bytes (= 4 + 0x38). As a result, it is necessary to add esp with the offset of 0x3C in order to access the memory field of arguments on the stack. The right operands at Line 2 and Line 4 in Figure 6c present the arguments after transformation.
Conditional Jump Targets Determination: Direct jump targets are implemented with hard-coding addresses in binary code, as shown at Line 6 and Line 13 in Figure 6b . BINPATCH needs to replace those address of the patch code with corresponding ones in D. For jumps within the patch code (e.g., Line 6 in Figure 6b ), their targets are decided by where the patch code is inserted in D in the step of Binary Rewriting ( §III-C). Thus, they are represented with placeholders temporally (loc_tag_0 at Line 7 in Figure 6c ). For jumps between the patch code and the original code (e.g., Line 13 in Figure 6b ), BINPATCH assigns their target values according to the results of path condition alignment ( §III-B2). Because the condition at Line 12-13 in Figure 6b could be aligned to the last one in Figure 3b , the condition flag (L→GE) and target address (loc_81AE7E0) are assigned accordingly, as shown at Line 15 in Figure 6c .
C. BINARY REWRITING
BINPATCH inserts the patch code by adding a new .text section to the program, as shown in Figure 7 . The left .text is the original one containing the candidate defective function (D), and the patch code is in the new .text on the right. At the insertion point, BINPATCH overwrites the original code with a jump instruction to the patch which generally consists of three parts ( 1 ) . The first part is the compatible patch code (patch_code). The placeholders in the patch code are calculated by adding their offsets to the address where the patch is placed in D (patch). The second part is the normal code of D overwritten by the jump instruction (overwritten_code). The last part is the jump instruction back to D ( 2 ). After this step, BINPATCH generates the patched binary program. Besides, a log recording the information of the rewriting is generated as well, including insertion point address, overwritten code size, patch code size, etc.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
BINPATCH supports binary code patching for ELF (Executable and Linkable Format) files on IA-32. Next, we introduce the solutions adopted in the implementation of BINPATCH.
A. BINARY INFORMATION EXTRACTION
BINPATCH requires argument offsets and function information (e.g., function addresses) to locate defective functions ( §III-A). Processes of patch code generation ( §III-B) and binary rewriting ( §III-C) are also performed on assembly code. We leverage IDA Pro, 6 an industrial strength reverse engineering tool, to disassemble binary code. We develop scripts with its plugin IDAPython which provides API to disassemble binary code and extract the information automatically.
B. INSTRUMENTATION AND EMULATION
We adopt Valgrind [51] to implement the instrumentation of BINPATCH. We develop our own instrumentation plugin with API provided by Valgrind to record the path conditions and runtime information of the correct function ( §III-B1). Valgrind adopts VEX-IR, a RISC-like intermediate representation, to unify the complex instruction set of IA-32. That feature facilitates the path triggering of BINPATCH. We implement the process of emulation with angr [62] , a static binary analysis framework. It also bases on VEX-IR, and provides interfaces to simulate the execution of IR code. Furthermore, it has built in the module of value set analysis required in the step of path condition alignment ( §III-B2).
V. EVALUATION
We evaluate BINPATCH with eight real-world Linux programs. Each one statically links a library which contains a known vulnerability in a defective function. The information of all the vulnerabilities is obtained from the CVE database. Table 1 Ground Truth: BINPATCH performs patching on stripped binary programs whose debug and symbol information is discarded. To evaluate the effectiveness and capacity of BINPATCH, we compile copies of the object programs and libraries with the -g option to establish the ground truth with the debug information and symbol names. As the source code of NConvert is unavailable, we manually analyze the program via reverse engineering and find corresponding functions of libpng as references.
A. EXPERIMENT SETUP

B. SUMMARY OF EXPERIMENTS
In the experiments, programs are compiled with their default configurations except for NConvert which is closed-source and downloaded from its homepage. summary of the experiments. The columns of Time show the time for patching in each step, and the last column (Condition Number) gives the number of path conditions for patch code generation. For all client programs, BINPATCH finishes the patching within 30 seconds. By manually verification, BINPATCH successfully locate the defective functions of all the client programs. It generates the correct patch code which protects each program from the vulnerability. Besides, the generated patch code certainly has no other side effects on original programs.
C. CASE STUDIES
We have taken NConvert as an example to illustrate how BINPATCH works in the section of Methodology ( §III). Next, we discuss several other specific cases in details.
1) OpenSSL (CVE-2014-0160)
Heartbleed is a buffer over-read bug in libssl 1.0.1 through 1.0.1f. The Heartbeat Extension tests TLS secure communication links by allowing client to send a Heartbeat Request message, which consists of a payload and the payload's length. The server then must send back the same payload to the client. OpenSSL uses the function tls1_process_heartbeat to implement the process, as shown in Listing 3. When the server copies the message at Line 23, if it does not check the length to ensure whether the payload length (payload) is not greater than the actual length of the payload (pl), an attacker could send a small payload but with a large length so as to obtain sensitive data in the active memory of the server, which is contained in the responding message. The correct version of the function adds a sanity check to avoid Heartbleed, as shown at Line 8-9.
BINPATCH correctly locates the defective function tls1_process_heartbeat in OpenSSL v1.0.1e. When triggering the path condition, tls1_process_heartbeat v1.0.1g is executed with an erroneous input, and it returns directly because payload is overlarge. When emulating tls1_process_heartbeat v1.0.1e, the emulation stops at the point of memory copy (Line 23) because the process requires more contents (payload) than the payload (pl) actually has, and there is no enough legal data to provide for the emulation. Afterwards, BINPATCH generates the patch code which exits the function if the input fails the check, then inserts it into the defective function finally.
2) gif2tiff (CVE-2013-4231)
gif2tiff is a utility which converts GIF (Graphics Interchange Format) images to TIF (Tagged Image File Format) with the help of the library libtiff. When processing GIF images, it needs to iterates over the LZW (Lempel-Ziv-Welch) code size which should be less than 13. The process is implemented with function readraster. However, libtiff v4.0.3 lacks the check that constrains the code size to be less than 13, as presented in Listing 4. The prefix and suffix arrays are defined with a constant length 4096 (2 12 ) at Lines 2-3. If the datasize is over 12, then the two arrays would be forced to overwrite a set of statically allocated buffers at Lines 9-10. libtiff v4.0.6 provides the patch condition before the indexing: datasize is the return value of glibc function getc, which is stored in eax:
; call _IO_getc cmp eax, 0Ch jg loc_804A48D; the function epilogue
The jump target (0x804A48D) is the epilogue of the function which cleans the frame of the function stack and returns. BINPATCH then inserts the patch code to the defective readraster before the comparison of the loop and after the calling of getc, which is right before Line 8 in Listing 4 on the source code level.
3) CURL (CVE-2016-7167)
Curl is a tool for getting and sending files using URL syntax. Curl v7.50.2 suffers from an integer overflow in function curl_easy_escape which is presented in Listing 5. If argument inlength is provided with a negative value -1 (0xFFFFFFFF in 2's complement), alloc is assigned with 0xFFFFFFFF which is not 0 (Line 3). Without checking the allocation size, the function is forced to allocate an overlarge buffer at Line 6. In the version of 7.50.3, the vulnerability is eliminated by adding the code: 
D. THREATS TO VALIDITY
For automatic source code repair (or fixing, patching), there have been sophisticated benchmarks to evaluate the performance of a newly proposed method, such as ManyBugs [36] for C/C++, Defects4J [31] for Java, etc. However, there is no such benchmarks for binary code patching. Due to the inherent complexity of binary code analysis, we are only able to study eight real-world vulnerabilities in details for the evaluation, showing BINPATCH is effective in locating and patching them, which cannot cover all cases. The threat could be reduced by employing more real-world instances of vulnerabilities in the future.
VI. DISCUSSION A. THE SCOPE OF BINPATCH
BINPATCH aims to assist analysts or maintainers in locating and patching known vulnerabilities in binary programs. The analysts have the knowledge of the program functionality and whether the program might contain the vulnerability. Since the vulnerability has been known, the error-triggering test case is available as well. BINPATCH is not designed to patch all kinds of vulnerabilities, but those handled by adding new conditions or modifying the original ones (e.g., buffer overflows). It generates patch code basing on the differential path condition between the correct and defective function. It becomes ineffective if the control flows of the two functions are the same that their path conditions are identical. Additionally, on the binary level, members of a data structure are accessed with offsets of constant values. Thus, BINPATCH performs patching under the condition that the data structures of the two functions should be the same. Namely, the same member of a data structure should be accessed with identical offset. Otherwise, the patch code would access wrong member variables in the defective function, and produce wrong behaviors.
Obfuscation and code refactoring are out of the scope of this paper. On one hand, techniques and solutions for deobfuscation have been well studied currently, such as bit-level taint analysis [77] , VMHunt [74] . If the object binary code is found to be obfuscated, it is better to deobfuscate it firstly, then perform further analysis. On the other hand, BINPATCH needs to locate the defective function for the following patching. It cannot handle the cases if the function is removed or combined into others because of refactoring.
In the section of Methodology ( §III), we present how BINPATCH patches the vulnerability by inserting code at one place of a function. Each time, it captures one patch condition once it finds the first unaligned element of the two path conditions. If a patch modifies multiple places of a function, after inserting the patch code at the first place, BINPATCH then re-emulates the defective function, and generates patch code for the next place.
B. FUNCTION INLINING
BINPATCH cannot handle inlined functions. On one hand, it relies on CACompare, the binary code similarity comparison technique, to locate the defective function. The accuracy of CACompare thus affects the performance of BINPATCH. CACompare cannot locate the inlined functions, which is still an issue for the topic [9] , [17] , [27] , [55] . As a result, BINPATCH is unable to patch the binary functions which are inlined into their callers. On the other hand, BINPATCH generates patch code basing on the (emulated) execution of the defective function and its corrected version. It requires the same input of the two functions. If the defective function is inlined, it is difficult to decide the input of its caller, which should ensure the corresponding input of the defective function to be the same as that of the correct function.
C. BINARY REWRITING
BINPATCH patches code by adding new .text sections which are connected with original code through long jumps ( 1 and 2 in Figure 7 ). There are also other methods to rewrite binaries. For instance, inserting code to gaps between functions. But the size of a gap is usually not enough for a patch. Another way is reassembling which injects patch to the original code and relocates it [68] , [70] . Since the long jumps added by BINPATCH might violate security requirements (e.g., Control Flow Integrity [1] ), reassembling is the future choice for BINPATCH.
D. PATCH RESTORATION
When analyzers or maintainers find that BINPATCH patches a wrong function, BINPATCH restores the modified function with the patching log generated after Binary Rewriting ( §III-C). Then, if BINPATCH is directly provided with the target defective function, it would attempt to patch that function. Otherwise, it would process the next function on the candidate defective function list generated after Defective Function Localization ( §III-A).
VII. RELATED WORK A. AUTOMATIC PROGRAM REPAIR
Automatic program repair (or fixing, patching) is motivated by the high costs of repairing defective programs. Numerous solutions have been proposed for source code repair [16] , [23] , [30] , [33] , [34] , [37] , [40] , [42] , [45] , [46] , [52] , [63] , [64] , [72] , [73] , [76] . As the source code is available, they have type information and symbol names for program synthesis. Besides, they assume they have plenty of test cases to detect defective code and generate the patch. We would not discuss that type of work in more details because this paper focuses on binary code patching where the source code is unavailable and test cases are inadequate. Next, we mainly discuss the solutions for binary code patching. Table 3 summaries the attributes of different solutions for binary code patching. EC [56] - [58] adopts the technique of SBFL (Spectrum-based Fault Localization) to identify the faulty binary instructions, which still requires numerous test cases to fulfill the target. It also needs test cases to specify the intended behaviors in order to search for the correct patch code (search-based patch generation). ClearView [54] and SafeStack [10] focus on overflow vulnerabilities, including buffer overflows, integer overflows, and heap overflows. They monitor running programs and patch them if they detect erroneous behaviors (Execution Verification), e.g., buffer overflowing. ClearView generates patch code by firstly learning runtime invariants from normal execution of the object binary program (Learning-based). It then alters the control flow when the invariants are violated. SafeStack fulfills patch generation basing on First-Aid [23] which leverages predefined code templates to correct overflow bugs (Modelbased). KARMA [11] patches the known vulnerabilities in Android kernels. Commonly, the binary code of Android kernels has the symbol information, i.e., non-stripped. Thus, with bug reports, the corresponding defective code could be located easily basing on symbol names (String Matching). Additionally, because of the nature of Linux (Android) kernels that the kernels are stable across multiple releases and well maintained, KARMA refers to the correct version of kernels, e.g., from upstream source, to extract patch code (Example-based).
Source code program repair is aimed at the processes of software development and testing, while binary program patching is software maintenance for released binary code which is usually stripped. There would be enough test cases for source code program repair for locating faulty code and verifying the correctness of candidate patch code, which is not realistic for binary code. BINPATCH aims to patch the known vulnerabilities in stripped binaries which lack test cases. It locates the defective function via static binary code similarity comparison. It merely adopts a few error-triggering test cases, which are accessible in vulnerability databases, to extract patch code from the correct code (Example-based), but does not depend on them to specify the intended correct behaviors. Thus, comparing to EC which needs a number of test cases and KARMA which is merely designed for nonstripped binaries, BINPATCH is more effective in patching real-world binary programs. Besides, ClearView captures invariants for patch generation from normal executions, and SafeStack generates patch code with pre-defined templates. It is difficult for them to cover all behaviors of the correct patch code. In contrast, BINPATCH extracts the corresponding code from the correct version of the object binary program as the patch which is the best practice to remove the vulnerabilities.
B. BINARY CODE SIMILARITY COMPARISON
The technique of binary code similarity comparison (or clone detection) has been well studied, and has numerous applications in software engineering and security.
Jhi et al. [29] and Zhang et al. [78] leverage invariants during the execution of binary code to detect software and algorithm plagiarism. Ming et al. [48] infer malware lineage via code clone comparison. However, above methods only analyze executed binary code and cannot cover all functions of the target program. Egele et al. [18] propose blanket execution to detect similar binary code. They break the normal execution of binary code to pursue high code coverage, while the detection accuracy decreases. Luo et al. [44] and Zhang et al. [79] adopt symbolic execution to software plagiarism. They rely on the performance of SAT/SMT solvers which cannot handle all cases. David et al. [12] - [15] break every basic block of a binary function into program slices. Each slice corresponds to an output of a basic block. The similarity of two functions is measured by counting the identical slices they have.
Multi-MH [55] , discovRE [20] , and Genius [21] are proposed to detect known bugs in binaries via code similarity analysis. However, discovRE and Genius base on control flow graphs which could be changed significantly because of different compilation configurations (e.g., variant compilers). Therefore, they are ineffective in comparing code compiled with different configurations in this paper. More recently, BinGo [9] , CACompare [27] , and IMF-sim [71] are proposed to detect similar binary code as well. Besides, BinShape [61] and BinSequence [28] are proposed to measure the similarity of binary function accurately and efficiently. For a reference function, they adopt filters to remove irrelevant target functions basing on syntax features. Then, BinShape adopts B++ tree to index feature vectors of functions for similarity comparison, while BinSequence explores function paths to infer the similarity of the reference function and each target function in pairs, which is similar to CoP [44] . BinArm [60] aims to detect vulnerabilities in firmware images. Similar to BinShape and BinSequence, it is also a multi-stage solution which adopts the filtering process to ensure the efficiency, then compares the similarity of functions via fuzzy matching of their control flow graphs. FOSSIL [2] is proposed to identify free open-source software functions in malwares. It adopts opcodes, paths of control flow graphs and opcode frequency distribution as code features. Then it applies zscore to the features and leverages the Bayesian network to calculate the similarity score of two functions.
Machine learning techniques are also applied to the topic. Xu et al. [75] train the neural network with the feature vectors extracted from control flow graphs of binary functions. Liu et al. [39] directly leverage machine code to compute best parameters for their neural network model. Ding et al. [17] treat a binary function as a document, and handle the problem with NLP (Natural Language Processing) techniques.
BINPATCH is proposed to patch known vulnerabilities in binary programs. It is worth nothing that the process of fault localization is not to detect new bugs, but to locate the known bugs in object binaries. Thus, in this paper, CACompare, an existing similar binary code detector, is adopted to fulfill the process, which is substitutable if there exists a better solution catering to the scenarios and requirements.
C. BINARY REWRITING
Binary rewriting is the process that transforms one binary into another, adding new metrics, such as security, while maintains the original functionality [65] . The rewriting could be realized either statically or dynamically. The static solutions perform offline modifications to the binaries, introducing lower overhead, while the dynamic solutions instrument the binary code at runtime, which guarantee a full-coverage transformation of COTS (Commercial Off-The-Shelf) or stripped binaries [68] .
1) STATIC BINARY REWRITING
Early static solutions focus on object files which contain debug and symbol information. With the information, it is easy to differentiate code from data and decide the targets of indirect calls/jumps. SASI [19] adds extra code to the object file for the security basing on the information provided by the compiler. In the similar way, Plot [59] and Diablo [67] fulfill code optimization and profiling via rewriting. BIRD [49] and PSI [81] are typical solutions which perform rewriting on COTS via detouring. They insert jump-out code, adding new text sections, to add new code. SecondWrite [53] is the first solution that implements binary rewriting with IR (Intermediate Representation). It lifts binary code into LLVM-IR, then translates the IR back to machine code after adding the new code. Zipr [24] and Zipr++ [25] are designed in the similar way to enforce the security of the original code. Dyninst [6] disassembles the binary function and extracts its control flow graph, then inserts new basic blocks into the graph. Uroboros [69] , [70] leverages the technique of reassembling which re-computes the addresses and offsets after inserting new code. It avoids the huge overhead introduced by detours (i.e. long jumps) or full IR translation. Ramblr [68] further eliminate several assumptions of previous work, making reassembling more robust for real-world cases. Multiverse [5] abandons the heuristics adopted by other solutions. It constructs mappings to find the corresponding new addresses of the original code and data. In addition to the above solutions working on the Intel architecture, Kim et al. propose RevARM [35] to rewrite binary code of ARM. They instrument the internal representations transformed from the original binaries, then generate the new binary code.
2) DYNAMIC BINARY REWRITING
Dynamic binary instrumentation (DBI) is the typical application of dynamic binary rewriting. With the runtime information, it is easier to obtain the targets of indirect calls and differentiate pointers from constants according to their usage (e.g., memory accessing, logic arithmetic). Currently, dynamic rewriting tools DynamoRIO [7] , [8] , Valgrind [50] , [51] and Pin [43] are widely used for DBI. The predecessor of DynamoRIO, Dynamo [3] , is a dynamic optimization system for code execution. Basing on Dynamo, DynamoRIO further provide various lightweight APIs (Application Programming Interfaces) which could monitor the execution of any binary instruction. Valgrind is a heavyweight solution for binary instrumentation. In addition to the APIs, it also introduces profiling tools, such as Memcheck, to analyze the runtime memory of the object program. Pin implements a virtual machine which takes the original code and instrumentation code as input, then handles the new code with a JIT (just-in-time) compiler and emulates the execution.
The focus of binary rewriting is how to insert new code to the original binaries, while that of binary patching is how to locate the defective code and generate patch code (the new code) to correct it. Binary patching needs the technology of binary rewriting to insert the patch code. In this paper, BINPATCH implements the rewriting with detouring which could be substituted with reassembling in the future ( §VI-C).
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present BINPATCH to automatically patch known vulnerabilities of binary programs. It locates defective code via similar code comparison, and generates patch code by reusing corresponding code from the correct version of the defective code. BINPATCH is evaluated with eight realworld vulnerabilities. The experimental results indicate that it is able to not only locate the defective functions in binary VOLUME 7, 2019 programs, but also generate the correct patch code so as to remove the vulnerabilities. 
